Post-colonial identity in Greenland?:When the empire dichotomizes back - bring politics back in by Gad, Ulrik Pram
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Post-colonial identity in Greenland?
Gad, Ulrik Pram
Published in:
Journal of Language & Politics
Publication date:
2009
Document version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Citation for published version (APA):
Gad, U. P. (2009). Post-colonial identity in Greenland? When the empire dichotomizes back - bring politics back
in. Journal of Language & Politics, 8(1), 136-158.
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
1 
Ulrik Pram Gad (2009)        upg@ifs.ku.dk 
Dept. of Political Science 
Research Priority "Europe in Transition" 
University of Copenhagen 
 
Post-Colonial Identity in Greenland? 
When the Empire Dichotomizes Back - Bring Politics Back In 
 
Journal of Language and Politics8(1):136-158 
 
 Please refer to published version for referencing and citing:  
http://www.jbe-platform.com/content/journals/10.1075/jlp.8.1.08gad 
 
Reproduced as Working Paper with kind permission by  
John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam/Philadelphia (www.benjamins.com) 
 
Abstract 
In the gradual unravelling of Greenland's colonial relationship to Denmark, an essentialist 
conceptualization of Greenlandic identity has played a significant role. However, both our scholarly 
understanding of post-colonial Greenlandic identity and the process towards independence for 
Greenland could be furthered by bringing politics back in. Based on a discourse analysis of the 
Greenlandic debate on language, this paper makes three claims: first, the identity projects promoted 
in Greenland are based on an essentialist conception of identity. Secondly, Greenlandic identity 
discourse combines elements of traditional Inuit culture and elements of colonial modernity. 
Thirdly, monolingual Greenlanders are those with the most to gain from abandoning the dichotomy 
of essentialist identities. Strategically, the paper suggests a post-post-colonial Greenlandic identity 
as a means of avoiding the exclusion of valuable human resources. One step towards relieving the 
relation to the Danish Other of identificatory weight could be a gradual shift to English as second 
language. 
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1. Introduction1 
Greenland is gradually unravelling its colonial relationship to Denmark. In 1953, the legal status of 
Greenland was transformed: Denmark chose, more or less unilaterally, to integrate the former 
colony as a county and its inhabitants as Danish citizens. After the Greenlandic version of the 1960s 
youth rebellion made its way across the Atlantic from the higher education institutions in Denmark, 
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a Home Rule arrangement was introduced in 1979. At present, the politicians are negotiating 'self-
government'; an enhanced version of Home Rule. If post-coloniality refers to a condition in which 
coloniality proper has formally ended but nevertheless continues to be a seemingly necessary 
reference for most of society, then Greenland may certainly be labelled a post-colonial society. 
Whatever the exact result of the ongoing negotiations, Greenlandic society remains post-colonial. In 
this sense, Greenlandic identity discourse may also be labelled post-colonial (cf. Mongia 1996:2). 
In the processes leading first to Home Rule and now to Self Government, the affirmation of 
a Greenlandic identity based on traditional Inuit culture and Greenlandic language has been 
decisive. This paper presents a strategic analysis of the current Greenlandic identity discourse and 
suggests to Greenlandic identity politicians a way forward based on this analysis. Specifically, the 
paper suggests a gradual shift to English as second language as a first step towards a post-post-
colonial Greenlandic identity. Fighting for a Greenlandic identity beyond post-coloniality might 
assist Greenland in crucial ways on its path to independence by making an inclusion of Danish-
speaking Greenlanders less problematic. It might also represent a step towards an identity discourse 
which lives up to post-colonialist standards. What this –ism implies is laid out in section 2. 
The paper then proceeds to make three theoretically informed empirical claims based on a 
discourse analysis of the Greenlandic debate on language: first (in section 3), that the identity 
projects promoted in Greenland are generally based on an essentialist conception of identity. 
Secondly (section 4), that Greenlandic identity discourse cannot be understood with reference to 
aboriginal Inuit culture alone; elements of modernity, imported by colonialism, have been included. 
Thirdly (section 5), that monolingual Greenlanders, be they Greenlandic speaking or Danish 
speaking, are those with the most to gain from abandoning this dichotomy of essentialist identities 
(Greenlandic vs. Danish). This analysis forms the basis for the strategic proposal made in the 
conclusion (section 6). 
 
2. Bringing politics back into post-colonial studies 
The paper initially characterized Greenland as a post-colonial setting since it is legally past its status 
as a colony; nevertheless, this colonial relation remains an inescapable reference for society. 
However, the mere temporal condition of post-coloniality is not alone in attempting to define post-
colonial identities: from a safe harbour in academia, post-colonialism is making prescriptions for 
how to conduct identity politics under post-colonial conditions. 
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A basic post-colonialist position would be to resist not only Western hegemony but also 
fixed Modernist categories such as that of 'identity' (Mongia 1996:2ff; Appiah 1996; Hall 
1996b:247). In the post-colonial predicament, the Modern demand for steadfast identity is relieved 
by hybridization, creolization etc. Even if this -ism and its prescriptions have indeed made their way 
into Greenlandic identity politics (Langgård 2002:82ff; Thomsen 1996:274; Sørensen 1991:52, 
151f; Christiansen 2000:67f; Pedersen 1997:153; 171; Bryld 2002:15; Lennert 2001:59), it remains 
a rather marginal novelty. While differing radically on other levels, the dominating strands of 
Greenlandic identity discourse remain – as the next section will show – essentialist. Hence, 
Greenlandic identity discourse is not particularly post-colonial (in the post–colonialist sense). Since 
the 1960s, the essentialist ethno-nationalist revivalism may be said to have been a wise strategic 
'choice' for the Greenlandic elite to further the de-colonization process: it has served as an argument 
for transferring sovereignty and resources from Denmark to Greenland much more rapidly than 
anyone imagined possible in the 1960s and 70s.
2
 
Literature and the social sciences
3
 each played a role in the process of colonization allowing 
modernization to reach the Other parts of the world (cf. Anderson 1991:Ch.2, 10). If one constructs 
concepts – of ethnic groups endowed with essential qualities and homogenous nation states with 
national literatures in national languages – with which to identify the world, one should not be 
surprised if the empirical world appropriates the concepts and identifies themselves with them 
(Briggs 1996). Analyzing and theorizing the Danish-Greenlandic relationship explicitly as a post-
colonial relationship has, however, largely been carried out by scholars of literature (including 
Thisted 2002; 2004; 2005; Hauge 2004; 2006; Newman 2004) and history (Thomsen 1996), though 
anthropology (including Sørensen 1991; 1994; Sejersen 2003) has contributed from comparable 
perspectives. The fact that the point of gravity in studies observing through post-colonialist lenses is 
in the humanities is not specific to the Greenlandic case (Petersen 2006:394). When it comes to 
perceiving the Danish-Greenlandic post-colonial relationship as a political relationship, the 
sociology of law of Hanne Petersen (i.a. 2003; 2006) has come closest, venturing deep into what 
would count as political philosophy. Political science has remained silent, even if the ongoing (post-
)modernization of Greenland has blurred the categorical dividing lines between the First and Fourth 
Worlds; and even if the social sciences hitherto in charge of Greenland have challenged political 
science by entering its domain: 
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[A] main purpose of earlier anthropology consisted in identifying cultures. Representatives of these so-called 
other cultures are now perfectly able to identify themselves, which leaves the scholars either out of job or 
with a new mission: to identify their identifications; in other words, to study reflexive identity politics. 
(Eriksen 2000:8). 
 
When focusing on reflexive identity politics, political science must follow Derrida and read the 
social world as text. In this sense, there is nothing wrong with the way the scholars of literature tell 
their stories. Quite the contrary, the artefacts they study both reflect and shape the wider identity 
discourses to some degree. Only it is important to remember that literature does not tell all the 
stories; important parts are neglected. 
Hence, it is time to bring politics back into the study of Greenlandic identity in three ways: 
a) By broadening the empirical focus from literary texts to include overtly political texts and non-
literary texts focusing on identity and language; b) by zooming in, not on the identities constructed, 
but on identity political negotiations and conflicts as such; c) by assuming responsibility for 
furthering the identity negotiations based on a strategic analysis of the current identity political 
landscape:
4
 
First, we must study other texts – other parts of the social world – than literature to 
understand the post-colonial condition. Novels and other literary constructs are important 
statements in the ongoing negotiation of Greenlandic identity (Thisted 2002:202, 221), and one of 
the main themes in Greenlandic literature is the relationship between Greenland and Denmark in 
general and the tensions between Greenlandic and Danish identity, culture and language in 
particular (Berthelsen 1983; 1988; Thisted 2002:204). A general aim of Greenlandic literature has 
been to help Greenlanders escape the subordinate position in relation to Denmark. However, the 
strategies for this escape have ranged from a propagation of assimilation to the dominant identity to 
the affirmation of a separate identity of equal or even superior value (Thisted 2002:205; cf. 
Berthelsen 1983; 1988). Literary texts do state and summarize important positions in Greenlandic 
identity politics, but they are much too sparse (cf. Berthelsen 1988:146) to represent the nuances of 
Greenlandic identity politics.
5
 
The literary texts could fruitfully be supplemented with two bodies of more political texts: 
texts produced within the framework of institutionalized politics may be useful, since they appeal to 
voters and hence presumably aim to resonate with the general public (Wæver 2002:42). Texts 
dealing with questions identified as central to identity and colonial relations may be political, even 
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though they purport not to be. In Greenland, it is difficult to speak about language without 
committing a political act; even if an important aspect of identity politics in Greenland and 
elsewhere consists of insisting on being above politics. 
Second, and more importantly, it might be rewarding to focus on the struggles to define 
identity rather than on the identity constructs as such communicated; more on identity politics than 
any single representation. We must study texts revealing disagreements within them or study 
disagreements between different instantiations of texts. Theoretically, this is warranted by the fact 
that identity is always in the making as ongoing discourse; it is always a claim (empirically, it 
seems obvious to me that Greenlandic identity is presently more of a struggle than anything else…). 
The carefully knitted literary texts may be more closed than more immediate reactions in other parts 
of identity negotiations. 
It should be clear from the first and second points that the third point – the responsibility to 
further the identity political negotiations – may only be tended to on the basis of an analysis of the 
present Greenlandic identity discourse. The debate on language stands central in Greenlandic 
identity politics, as Greenlandic language is featured as a prominent element in Greenlandic identity 
and, hence, as an active diacriticon for inclusion/exclusion (Gad 2005:77f, 146; cf. Sejersen 
1999:130; Kleivan 1999b:98; Lennert 2001:57). This is why the following sections present an 
overview of the basic elements in Greenlandic identity politics necessary to understand the 
problematique of language policy in Greenland, before the concluding section in the paper takes up 
the constructive task of suggesting a path forward.
6
 
 
3. Digital essentialism in Greenlandic identity discourse 
This section of the paper claims that the identity projects currently promoted in Greenland are based 
on essentialist conceptions of identity. To make this claim, a basic definition of identity is initially 
provided in two parts by noting, first, that identity is a discursive phenomenon, and, secondly, that 
identity is constituted in relation to Others.  
The point of departure for this paper is that within the social sciences, 'identity' is always – 
whether consciously or not – shorthand for 'identity discourse'. Literally, no two persons are 
identical. Nor are any of us identical with those we were merely one or two experiences ago (cf. 
Fink 1991). So identity is not something out there; nor is not something inside. Identity (i.e. identity 
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discourse) is when we speak about A and B being identical; or when we speak as if A and B were 
identical. This means that we can only observe identity in discourse (Frello 2003:5f). 
The claim that someone is identical entails that someone else is said to be different. Hence, 
identity discourse involves drawing boundaries and thereby including some as identical and 
excluding others as different (cf. Derrida 1988:52). Bearing the colonial relations in mind, it comes 
as no surprise that the primary Other from which Greenlandic identity is different – and from which 
Greenlandic identity is threatened – is Denmark, Danes and phenomena perceived as being Danish 
(Sørensen 1991:48, 121). 
A number of traits inherent in Greenlandic identity discourse indicate that both the 
Greenlandic identity and its Danish Other are seen as springing from essentially different cultures 
(cf. Sørensen 1994:168ff, 176ff) which do not easily mix. Cultural elements and practices appear to 
be digitally or discretely distributed: either they are thoroughly Danish and, hence, not Greenlandic; 
or they are truly Greenlandic and, hence, not Danish. The possibility of an analogue gradation from 
Greenlandic to Danish or combinability of Greenlandic and Danish is precluded (cf. Langgård 
2003:219ff; Frello 2003:73-4; Eriksen 1993:114ff et passim). 
It appears basic to Greenlandic identity discourse that, on the inside, every person has a 
kernel defining the real person as it would unfold if allowed. And in parallel: on the inside, every 
culture seems to have a kernel defining the real culture as it would unfold if allowed. This kernel – 
which basically includes elements of traditional Inuit material culture fitted to survival in the High 
North (Sørensen 1994:103, 125ff; 1991:187) and which definitively includes Greenlandic language 
(Thomsen 1996:270) – is hereditary: it takes at least one Greenlandic parent to be a Greenlander 
(Kleivan 1999b:98).  
Hence, a Dane can never be a Greenlander: if s/he learns to speak Greenlandic, new exams 
emerge: do you know how to behave in Greenlandic nature? Do you enjoy mattak (whale skin) and 
other kalaalimerngit (Greenlandic food) (cf. Kleivan 1996; Petersen 1991:18)? The delimitation of 
Self and Other requires a measure of flexibility to be upheld (Barth 1969). 
Nevertheless a Greenlander may be criticized for being too Danish: a person's gait and 
posture may be enough to label her/him Danish (Sørensen 1991:fn.11); walking straight and tall 
signifies that you are accustomed to level pavement; if you were raised on the rocks of a small 
settlement, your gait should be more rolling and shuffling (Udvalget 1963:46ff). Well-educated 
Greenlanders – who spent years in Denmark – need to frequently stress their Greenlandic identity in 
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meetings etc lest they be called Danish (Sørensen 1991:50; 1994:143; cf. Bryld 2002:15). Modern, 
urban life is basically excluded from Greenlandic identity, even if most Greenlanders actually live 
in cities (Thomsen 1996:265, 270). 
Even if a Greenlander is too Danish, however, due to the inherent kernel of Greenlandic 
culture, s/he never ceases being a Greenlander. Hence, a Danish-speaking Greenlander – or every 
Greenlander living in a society influenced by Denmark – must experience a feeling of being split 
(Sørensen 1994:168ff; cf. Christiansen 2000:64). 
Some of the participants in the Greenlandic debate on language – namely some of the 
monolingual Danish-speaking Greenlanders – actually did challenge this alleged feeling of being 
split: 'No', their claim was, they did not feel split between a Greenlandic and a Danish half. But 
even they upheld the image of Greenlandic and Danish as a digital question of either/or: these 
Danish-speaking Greenlanders 'merely' tried to re-draw the delimiting line along different diacritica, 
allowing themselves to be Greenlandic even though they did not speak Greenlandic (Gad 2005:160, 
179f, 211ff, 230f).
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Ultimately, to make sense in Greenlandic identity discourse, you must speak as if real 
Greenlandic identity grows out of an aboriginal Greenlandic culture and as if this culture is 
essentially discrete from and exclusive vis-à-vis that of the Danish Other: Danish and Greenlandic 
may at best blend like oil and vinegar, but the mixture will most likely behave like waste oil 
dumped on the water of the fjords of Greenland (cf. Thisted 2002). Any deviation from this position 
must be argued – at least when 'Danish' and 'Greenlandic' is explicitly related. At the same time, 
however, a much more complex image of Greenlandic identity emerges when discussing what is 
actually of value in Greenland of the present and the future. This is the focus of the next section. 
 
4. Modern and traditional elements in Greenlandic identity discourse 
The preceding section found that Greenlandic identity is basically constituted in relation to a Danish 
Other. Since identity is a discursive phenomenon rather than an essence encoded somewhere once 
and for all, however, any criterion to include in the Self or exclude as Other is open to challenge by 
the next honourable speaker. When conceptualizing identity as discourse, we cannot but open 
identity up to politics (Connolly 1991:ix, 65).
8
 This section of the paper claims that Greenlandic 
identity, as it is implied in discourse, cannot be understood with reference to traditional Inuit culture 
alone; elements of modernity – imported by colonialism – have been included. The insistence on 
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simultaneously prioritizing traditional Inuit culture and including modern practices as Greenlandic 
spurs tension in discourse and makes for complex rhetorical manoeuvrings. 
Greenlandic identity politics – i.e. the negotiations over what Greenlandic identity should 
be – evolves around two basic narrative figures: a figure of the decline of traditional culture and a 
figure of modernization (Gad 2005:61-70, 180-200; cf. Thomsen 1996; Adolphsen 2002; Larsen 
1992a:391). 
The basic narrative figure of present-day Greenlandic identity politics is the decline of the 
Noble Greenlandic Savage and his culture. While the image of the noble savage – fitted by his close 
connection to nature to relate to both man and beast in a respectful and ecologically functional 
manner – originates in European romanticism, it has been taken over by the Greenlanders 
themselves as an adequate depiction of their ancestors (cf. Thomsen 1996; Pedersen 1997:165; 
Sørensen 1994; Sejersen 1999:128). On this background, development is "not just a neutral, 
technological machinery following its own laws. Development refers to Danishness as well. It is 
assumed that Development leads to a hollowing out of what is specifically Greenlandic" (Sørensen 
1994:101, my transl.). Hence, to stop the decline and recover the true values of Inuit tradition, the 
Danish Other is to be returned to the Eastern shores of the Atlantic Ocean where he belongs. But 
there is another Other at play as well: the corrupted, present-day Greenlander serves as an Other 
who must perform the well-known nationalist turn and restore the glory of the Golden Days of Inuit 
culture to live out his true identity (cf. Smith 1991:161). 
However, an alternative narrative figure – that of modernization – has opposite 
implications: the point of departure is the self-same image of an aboriginal Greenlandic culture in 
decline – but according to this social Darwinist line of thought, such hunter/gatherer cultures are 
doomed, as they are not fit for modernity (Gad 2005:61-64, Thomsen 1996:279; Thorleifsen 
1992:22f; Kleivan 1999a). In the beginning of the 20th century, the presence of the maternalist 
Danes was generally presented as being fortunate: the Danes were there to attend to the 
modernization of the Greenlandic children (cf. Thomsen 1996:269ff). The Danes might be Others, 
but the real Other to overcome was the noble but doomed savage.  
After WWII, formal equality was declared, but the realities were disappointing (Petersen 
1992:185; Sørensen 1991:48; Thomsen 1996:271), since social and ethnic cleavages still coincided 
(Thomsen 1996:272; Larsen 1992b:387; Kleivan, H. 1969; Udvalget 1963:43). Hence, both the 
modernization figure and the rise of a Greenlandic elite within the Danish framework appeared to 
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be blocked (cf. Anderson 1991:53ff), and Greenlandic identity discourse was primed for the 
nationalist turn. 
Most Greenlandic politics can be read as a negotiation of how this nationalist restoration 
project is to be configured. The basis for this claim is that the figure of decline cannot perform the 
restoration of yesterday's aboriginal Inuit culture into a full-fledged independent nation-state. Since 
the nation state is, if anything, a modern conception (cf. Gellner 1983; Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 
1990; Smith 1998), the nationalist project must import elements of the figure of modernization. In 
Greenland, however, modernization comes in Danish guises. Hence the need to carefully select the 
necessary elements of modernity and precariously articulate them in relation to Greenlandic identity 
discourse in ways that let modernity in without appearing Danish (Gad 2005:180-200). 
No one articulates a Greenlandic society that is not a democratic welfare society. Quite to 
the contrary, democratic values, specific democratic practices and democracy itself, as well as the 
level of welfare and the development towards an independent welfare state, are repeatedly pointed 
out as threatened by various elements of implemented or suggested language policy (Gad 2005:150-
162, 176-178, 189, 207-211). 'Democracy' and 'welfare' are pointed out as indispensable qualities of 
Greenland; both in the present-day version and even more the Greenland in the making. This 
suggests democracy and welfare as irreducible aspects of Greenlandic identity.
9
 
The inclusion of these elements in Greenlandic identity does not, however, tell exactly how 
Greenland is supposed to be a democracy and a welfare state. It does not even say what it means 
that Greenland is to be a democracy and a welfare state. It merely lays out some premises for the 
continued debate to which you, as a participant, must obey if you want to make sense – and which 
you may utilize as argumentative resources: if you can claim that this or that element of the figure 
of modernization – i.a. the provision of good Danish language education – is a prerequisite for a 
prospering welfare state, you have made it necessary for your opponent to tell an even better story 
(cf. Gad 2005:187ff). And in parallel: if you can argue that this or that – i.a. linguistic rights or 
limits to voting rights – are a prerequisite for a proper democracy, you have at least forced your 
opponent into an exchange over what constitutes a proper democracy (Gad 2005:150ff). 
The inclusion of these distinctively modern elements induces tensions in Greenlandic 
identity discourse. This is hardly special; discourse is never absolutely harmoniously constituted 
(Laclau & Mouffe 1985:ch.3). Furthermore, identity discourse is particularly paradoxical, since it is 
always possible to claim that any development, distortion or distinction violates our being identical 
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(Derrida 1988:52; Žižek 1992:197; Wæver 1993:26ff). A precise characterization of the tensions in 
identity discourse is necessary to understand identity politics, since the tensions constitute obvious 
objectives for political intervention. 
The inclusion of 'democracy' in Greenlandic identity spurs a tension between two visions 
of democracy: one departing from the rights of the individual and insisting that all inhabitants of the 
territory of Greenland must be equal citizens; and another departing from the rights of ethnic 
communities, insisting that the Greenlandic democracy provides a means for Inuit Greenlanders to 
define their own future (Gad 2005:150-162, 211). 
The inclusion of 'welfare' in Greenlandic identity offsets a number of tensions. One of the 
most problematic is the tension between the need for education (provided in Danish) in order to 
provide the personnel necessary for the welfare state versus the fundamental exclusion of 
everything Danish, especially the Danish language, from the category of Greenlandic (Gad 
2005:180-200, 211). 
To sum up: Greenlandic identity and its inherent development towards an independent, 
democratic welfare nation state depend
10
 on articulating selected elements of a figure of 
modernization into the basic figure of decline. There seems to be agreement concerning the 
inclusion of at least two modern elements: democracy and welfare; however, there is no agreement 
as to how these elements ought to be included and how they should be substantiated. The role and 
place of Danish language specifically highlights these tensions. The next section analyses how the 
precarious and contradictory construction of Danish language in relation to Greenlandic identity has 
produced a linguistic elite of bilinguals. 
 
5. The linguistic elite in Greenland 
This section claims that monolingual Greenlanders – be they Greenlandic speaking or Danish 
speaking – are those with the most to gain from abandoning the dichotomy of essentialist identities 
(Greenlandic vs. Danish). This claim is based on a partial dethroning of Danes as the unequivocal 
linguistic elite in Greenland. 
At one level, it is perfectly legitimate to point out Danish as privileged in relation to 
Greenlandic in contemporary Greenlandic society: fluency in Danish and higher education 
(acquired in Denmark) is generally required to occupy leading positions in formal organizations 
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(business, administration and many interest-based organizations). Hence, Danish speakers occupy 
most high influence/high income positions in Greenland (Christiansen & Togeby 2003), and you 
may still credibly apply the colonial categories as a spectrum: the elite is more Danish than the 
subaltern which is more Greenlandic than the elite. This is the 'colonial' dimension of Greenlandic 
post-coloniality (cf. Thisted 2002:203-4). 
However, there is also a 'post-' dimension of Greenlandic post-coloniality. This 'post-' 
dimension transcends mere temporal post-coloniality, bearing reminiscence to the post-
colonialist/post-structuralist celebration of hybridity and in-betweenness (cf. Bhabha 1996; Gad 
2005:221-234). A number of positions in Greenlandic society are generally manned with persons 
speaking Greenlandic (e.g. MPs, ministers, the bishop, the Ombudsman, most top administrative 
posts) (Christiansen & Togeby 2003). These positions entail so much interaction with Danish-
speaking bodies of administration that knowledge of Danish language seems to be an additional 
imperative; they have generally been taken by bilinguals.
11
 Even though these bilinguals may 
occasionally be criticized for being too Danish (cf. p. 7 above), their knowledge of Greenlandic 
language privileges them in relation to monolingual Danish speakers.
12
 This privileged position 
may be utilized beyond the appropriation of formal positions: bilinguals may switch language at 
strategic points of conversations or meetings to exclude monolinguals (Heilmann 1999:48). 
This sketch of the upper strata of the linguistic stratification in Greenland leaves little 
doubt that monolingual Greenlandic speakers are placed in the lower end of the stratification along 
important dimensions. First and foremost, important parts of their daily life – let alone qualified 
participation in democracy – are impeded by exclusion from information which is of value in any 
modern society but simply not translated into Greenlandic. This exclusion is one consequence of the 
Home Rule government giving rhetorical priority to Greenlandic language since 1979 – without 
substantially prioritizing the means or ends in language policy (Gad 2005:224f). The result of the 
language policies implemented over the course of 25 years of Home Rule is the impression of the 
presence of the Danish language in Greenland as a temporary error to be corrected (Gad 2005:157). 
This also forms the background for the fact that along other dimensions, monolingual 
Danish speakers are – as implied in the above sections – excluded from Greenlandic identity and 
society. The implications of this exclusion may be negligible as concerns temporary migrant 
workers from Denmark, who generally plan to and actually do return to Denmark after a very short 
period of time (cf. Tróndheim 2002).
13
 Monolingual Danish speakers who consider themselves 
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Greenlanders – due to being raised and sometimes born in Greenland14 – are an altogether different 
question. Ethically, their exclusion is a much more serious problem, since it denies them their right 
to self-definition. Economically, their exclusion is potentially one of the greatest losses for 
Greenland on its way to legal, political and economic independence. 
The mechanisms of this exclusion are complex. The ambiguity of the 'linguistic market' in 
Greenland (Langgård 2003:227f; Gad 2005:211-215) serves as the general background: neither the 
priorities of the Home Rule government nor the expectations of people you meet in the streets or in 
the workplace are clear as regards the linguistic capabilities of the individual. Nor are the valuations 
of the linguistic capabilities: on the one hand, speaking Danish constitutes a betrayal of aboriginal 
Greenlandic identity (Gad 2005:199f). On the other hand, Danish is simultaneously – both at the 
individual and societal levels – presented as a way forward: as a means to education, to 
development (economic as well as intellectual) and independence (Gad 2005:187f, 211-215). 
This ambiguity influences everyone living in Greenland; however, monolingual Danish-
speaking Greenlanders are probably the most affected: following Butler, one might say that the 
subject of the Danish-speaking Greenlander is constituted by the expressed expectations of others – 
i.e. by discourse – in such a manner that "One is still constituted by discourse, but at a distance from 
oneself" (1997:33f). If one's self-understanding is at odds with the expressed expectations of the 
others, "one can be 'put in one's place' by such speech, but such a place may be no place" (1997:4, 
137). 
The reactions to such displacement may be categorized as either loyalty (silence), voice 
(attempting to re-identify oneself), or exit (exile in i.a. Denmark).
15
 Until recently, silence appears 
to have been the main option. In 2002, however, a group of monolingual Danish-speaking 
Greenlanders founded 'GLDK' as a forum for developing Greenlandic language policy. Implicit in 
this move was both a criticism of the alleged social repression leading to the prior silence of the 
group and an attempt at redefining Greenlandic identity discourse to allow for the inclusion of the 
group (Gad 2005:162-174). One of the occasions – and implicitly one of the weapons employed in 
the struggle for recognition – was a recent report stating that monolingual Danish-speaking 
Greenlanders returning from education in Denmark did not feel welcome (Lund & Nathanielsen 
2000). If these monolingual Danish-speaking Greenlanders do not feel welcome when returning 
from education in Denmark or other countries, they might very well end up remaining abroad (Gad 
2005:189). 
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Frello warns that "if the concept of hybridity gives rise to an indifferent celebration of 
difference it creates blindness to the unequal power relations always involved" (Frello 2005:101, 
my transl.). Taking into account the basic essentialism of Greenlandic identity discourse and the 
place of monolingual Danish-speaking Greenlanders, Greenlandic identity politics appears to be far 
from such an indifferent celebration of hybridity. Quite the contrary, one specific kind of hybridity 
(bilingualism) seems to be privileged, while another (Danish language in combination with 
Greenlandic self-identification) seems to be delegitimized. This example serves to stress the 
importance of remaining aware of the power relations and not just the essentializations, i.e. the 
specific dynamics and mechanisms of identity politics and not just on any resulting dichotomy, be it 
Greenlandic/Danish or identity/hybridity. However, this makes getting the message through to 
empirical identity politicians more difficult: it seems as though little neat identity boxes are easier to 
communicate than complex and nuanced pictures of differentiated hybridity. 
To sum up the analysis of this section: the ambiguity of the present Greenlandic 'linguistic 
market' empowers bilinguals. Hence, even though monolingual Greenlandic speakers are supposed 
to be the beneficiaries of Home Rule language policies, in effect they lose. Monolingual Danish 
speakers also lose – especially those identifying themselves as Greenlanders – even if the character 
of their loss is different than that of monolingual Greenlandic speakers. For the monolingual Danish 
speakers, however, emigration is a viable alternative. This alternative deprives Greenland of a 
valuable resource on its path to independence. 
 
6. From "The Empire dichotomizes back" to post-post-colonial identity 
Section 3 concluded that making sense to the Greenlandic identity discourse requires speaking as if 
real Greenlandic identity grows out of traditional Inuit culture essentially discrete from and 
exclusive vis-à-vis that of the Danish Other. Any diversion from this position must be argued. This 
seems to be at odds with the conclusion of section 4, namely that Greenlandic identity and its 
inherent development towards an independent, democratic welfare nation state depend on 
articulating selected elements of a figure of modernization into the basic figure of the decline of 
traditional Inuit culture. This oddity stems from the inability of the Noble Savage to restore his 
dignity but in the form of a modern, independent nation state. The tensions of the negotiations over 
how these elements of modernity ought to be included in Greenlandic identity and how they should 
be substantiated are highlighted by the role and position of Danish language. Section 5 concluded 
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that the resulting ambiguities of the present Greenlandic 'linguistic market' empower bilinguals 
primarily over monolingual Greenlandic speakers, though also over monolingual Danish-speaking 
Greenlanders. 
As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, literature and the social sciences each played 
roles in the colonization process, not least by constructing world views and concepts which the 
colonial objects of study have subsequently appropriated and now identify with. As the Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies (1982) saw the British Empire strike back against racism in 
England, and Ashcroft et al. (2002) analyzed post-colonial literature in general as the Empire 
writing back, the Greenlandic identity politics of the last decades of the 20th century can be read as 
the Danish Empire dichotomizing back. The practical result has been the paradoxical empowerment 
of bilinguals, which this article has identified. 
A popular post-structuralist posture in this situation would be to equate the purpose of one's 
research in identity politics with literature criticism; i.e. not to judge between good and bad identity 
politics, but to make the public more sensitive to the tools applied by identity politicians (cf. 
Czarniawska 1998). Such a seemingly neutral posture seems to dodge the responsibility to engage 
real world identity politics – whether the responsibility springs from the deeds of past colleagues in 
academia or from a general human condition. Hence, the paper will proceed from the strategic 
analysis in the proceeding sections to suggest that Greenlandic identity politicians – if their aim is 
an independent Greenlandic welfare state – venture to develop a post-post-colonial identity as a 
means to that end. 
Appiah insists (1996) that the post-colonial involves a 'space-clearing gesture' providing 
room for new identities. This gesture clears away coloniality as well as the modern category of the 
nation. Hall (1996a; cf. Mongia 1996:11) more subtly describes identity as an oscillation between  
the play of differences versus periods of more or less strategic essentialism: at times the anti-
colonial struggle must coalesce around an identity posing a certain fixity in order to attain 
momentum. At other times, the de-naturalization of the fixed, Modernist categories takes 
precedence to allow for the emancipations of other particular identities than the after-colonial 
nationalist.
16
 Another way of phrasing the point in this final section of the paper is that it suggests 
Greenlandic identity politicians to revisit their strategy: as 'the Empire has dichotomized back' for 
some decades, it might be time to bring politics back in to challenge essentialism. 
15 
Since the 1960s, the essentialist ethno-nationalist revivalism may be said to have been a 
wise strategic 'choice' vis-à-vis the Greenlandic de-colonialization process: specifically, it has 
provided basis for a 'politics of embarrassment' (Kristensen 2004) using the Danish self-
understanding as a liberal moralistic pioneer country (cf. Browning 2007; Hansen 2002) in pressing 
the Danish authorities to enhance Greenland's legal status and political manoeuvring room. 
However, the ethno-nationalist revivalism has only been partially successful in spurring the 
enthusiasm and self-sacrifice from the individual Greenlander required to make Greenland self-
sufficient economically and education-wise (cf. Skydsbjerg 2001). Furthermore, placing 
Greenlandic language as the key diacriticon for inclusion in Greenlandic identity has excluded a 
most resourceful group needed for creating a future independent Greenlandic welfare state: the 
monolingual Danish-speaking Greenlanders who have generally fared best of the Greenlanders 
pursuing education in Denmark (Skydsbjerg 2001). Hence, the result of ethno-nationalism is a 
strong will for an independent Greenland
17
 – but too few Greenlanders to man an independent 
Greenlandic welfare state. 
To include the monolingual Danish-speaking Greenlanders and secure that they work for 
the benefit of a future independent Greenlandic welfare state, Greenlandic identity politicians could 
aim for constructing a post-post-colonial Greenlandic identity;
18
 an identity transcending the 
constant reference to the colonial Other: Denmark. 
The basic post-colonialist/post-structuralist critique remains valid: when aimed in the 
abstract at the Modernist quest for order at the expense of ambiguity – and when aimed at every 
nicely delimited box resulting from this quest: the idea of a pure language, the idea of a 
homogenous nation, the idea of the self-sufficient ethnic group, etc. Hybridity, syncretism and 
related practices (Frello 2005; Mørck 1999) may – if accepted – serve as media for translation and 
dialogue (Sørensen 1994:140; cf. Todorov 1999:202-241). We must welcome any further relaxation 
of the walls delimiting the self-perceived homogenous cultures possibly leading to "our living in 
difference, and not to some of us dying from Otherness" (Neumann 1996:168). But taking into 
consideration just how sedimented the essentialist conceptions of cultures and identity seem to be, 
more specific steps must be made available.
19
 
One of the distinctive aspects of a colonial – and hence post-colonial – relationship is that 
the colonized has not itself chosen who to be dominated by.
20
 Today, however, Greenland is 
basically in a position to choose its own dominator. This is not an unconstrained choice – no 
16 
choices are – but a choice nevertheless. One of the Comoros – the island of Mayotte – chose to 
remain colonized
21
 by France and enjoy OCT
22
 status in relation to the EU – while the other islands 
opted for independence. Or rather, the majority of the Comoros opted for dissolving their unilateral 
colonial dependency relation to France into the broader post-colonial dependency relation of any 
third world country. 
60 years ago, Iceland – Greenland's next-door neighbour in a comparable North Atlantic 
geographical condition – opted for independence from Denmark. In terms of the focus of this paper 
– i.e. the binary Other relations to the former colonial power – one might today evaluate the result 
of the subsequent process as a success: Iceland has successfully reoriented and differentiated its 
relations to include other dependency relations: mainly to the USA for security; the Scandinavian 
countries for education; but increasingly the UK for education and investment (notably, Icelandic 
investments abroad). 
Greenland could make the same differentiation. And – provided the political will – this 
could be carried out within or outside of the present constitutional status. Three examples: first, 
nothing prevents the Home Rule government from redirecting the government-owned ships which 
import almost all goods to Greenland from the Danish provincial port of Aalborg to, say, Halifax. 
Secondly, the Home Rule government could negotiate a deal to make the partly Home Rule-owned 
Air Greenland use Iceland's Keflavik as a hub, thereby linking Greenland to both Europe and North 
America via a shorter detour than via Copenhagen.
23
 Thirdly, Greenland could follow the Icelandic 
model and prioritize the teaching of global English as a second language instead of provincial 
Danish.
24
 
This discussion of replacing Danish with English is a classic in Greenlandic identity 
politics (Engell 1982:168f). Today, the English language is constructed in a number of different 
ways in the Greenlandic debate on language (Gad 2005:194-197):  
I) as a road to modernity (just as Danish, only wider);  
II) as a threat to Greenlandic language and identity (just as Danish, only greater);  
III) as an 'Egg of Columbus' providing modernity without the threat of the primary 
Danish Other. 
A strong argument may be constructed in which Danish represents a bulwark against the English 
tidal wave of globalization (Lynge 2002; cf. Lynge 1999). However, a gradual shift to English as 
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second language could serve a greater good: by facing (English-speaking) globalization without the 
(Danish-speaking) colonial connotations, elements of modernization could very well be easier to 
incorporate in Greenlandic identity. And more importantly: it might become easier to include 
Danish-speaking Greenlanders. 
 The debate on the implications of the advance of English as a global lingua franca is heated, 
both in academia and in a number of national political contexts.
25
 To mention just one example: as 
Estonia and Latvia emerged from Soviet rule and re-established themselves as nation states with a 
substantial, privileged Russian-speaking stratum, the immediate impulse was to introduce harsh 
monolingual policies promoting Estonian and Latvian as the national languages. Both the more 
relaxed attitudes of bilingual everyday life and the mellowing effect of European institutional 
frames on minority policies appear to have eased tensions somewhat.
26
 This leads one observer – 
having noted the "common adoption of the cultural forms of an English-speaking Europe" (Laitin 
2003:217) whereby the English language may serve as a communication platform (1996:50, 60) – 
to optimistically summarize the development by claiming that all residents of Estonia "are adding 
rather than substituting cultural repertoires" (2003:214).
27
  
As speakers of a post-colonial language, the position of Russians in the Estonian linguistic 
market is somewhat parallel to the position of Danish speakers in Greenland.
28
 And as the Icelandic 
example demonstrates, shifting from Danish to English as the second language in Greenland might 
contribute to moving much of the identificatory weight away from the strained colonial relation
29
 
and, hence, aid the Greenlandic welfare state to make the most of its most valuable educational 
assets on its path to independence: the primarily Danish-speaking Greenlanders. A switch to 
English might not ameliorate the situation for monolingual Greenlandic speakers immediately. To 
the contrary, the short-term effect might be to give Danish speakers (whether they also speak 
Greenlandic or not) an advantage over the rest of the population; being the comparatively most 
educated, they are more likely to also speak English. Implemented consistently if gradually, 
however, it should also contribute to making the linguistic market in Greenland more manoeuvrable 
for monolingual Greenlandic speakers: it could be easier for the individual Greenlander to engage in 
– and for the Home Rule politicians to prioritize – foreign language education in an educational 
system focusing on global English instead of colonial Danish. 
 Furthermore, even if a switch to English would not necessarily entail a shift away from 
looking to Denmark for the import and export of goods, education, recruitment etc, replacing 
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Danish with English would make the possibility of such switches in substantial relations more 
visible. And while the argument of this paper remains that such a differentiation of relations could 
constitute a way out of post-coloniality, "could" is actually the key word in this section: an equally 
important element in a move beyond post-colonial identity would be the very acknowledgement and 
accept of the possibility of an independent Greenlandic agency. Greenland must acknowledge that it 
possesses a measure of choice in its relations with the rest of the world; it is not forced to stick to 
Denmark. There might be restraints on the free choices of any actor – individual or collective. But 
while colonial restrictions were enforced with brute force, at least some of the restrictions in post-
coloniality exist mainly within the mind of the (in that sense still-) colonized. 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1
 This paper has benefited from comments from my former colleagues in the Home Rule bureaucracy, Mette-
Astrid Jessen and Mikaela Engell; comments from the participants in the conference Managing the Post-Colonial 
Experience at the University of Aarhus on 30-31 August 2006; comments from members of the Danish politological EU 
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studies PhD network; comments from Lene Hansen; and from the anonymous reviewers of the Journal of Language & 
Politics. I am thankful to Maarja Siiner and Uffe Jakobsen for leading me to relevant literature on the linguistic 
situation in the Baltic States.  
2
 A number of the leading figures in the Greenlandic youth rebellion, which was the driving force behind the 
introduction of Home Rule in 1979, remain central in Greenlandic politics, even though they now share their ruling 
Siumut (Forward) party with younger generations of politicians. The veterans of the more radical Inuit Ataqatigiit 
(Human Community) party are almost equally slow in retiring. The moderate tendency in Greenlandic politics has 
undergone a more thorough rejuvenation in two ways: The old Atassut (Link – to Denmark, that is) party now has an 
all-post-1979 leadership – and it has received competition from the new Demokraatit party. Generational questions 
aside, the question of the relations to Denmark and Danes continue to structure Greenlandic party politics – to such a 
degree that the initially Marxist Leninist IA has been leading the way in market-oriented reforms to further self-
subsistence. For the history and structure of the Greenlandic political party system, cf. Larsen (1992b), and Dahl (1986).  
For accounts of the political development of the Home Rule arrangement, cf. Skydsbjerg (1999), Lauritzen (1997). 
3
 Especially its department for Third and Fourth World; anthropology (Eriksen 2000; Rantonen & Savolainen 
2002:75). 
4
 A different but related argument for shifting the focus from the social construction to the political 
construction of identity is forwarded by Smith (2003:38). It should be clear by now that 'identity politics' is not used in 
the same way in this paper as it is by certain proponents for US American minority groups (cf. 2003:11; Heyes 2002), 
who use the label for the struggle for recognition as a predefined minority group and for the subsequent struggle for 
rights based on this recognition. In a post-structuralist vein, the paper sees these struggles as parts of a greater identity 
political negotiation process about who is to be recognized as what on the basis of which diacritica and with what effect. 
5
 Obviously, other foci possibly leave out other constructs. 
6
 The arguments in this paper develop empirical insights from Gad (2005), which documents the empirical 
claims as well as the specific analytical strategy employed in an empirical analysis focused on the place for 
monolingual Danish-speaking Greenlanders in Greenlandic identity discourse. The discourse analysis covered all of the 
2002 editions of both of the Greenlandic newspapers Atuagagdtliutit/Grønlandsposten and Sermitsiaq, as well as the 
2002 proceedings of the Greenlandic Parliament, Inatsisartut/Landstinget. The reasons and apologies for only covering 
the Danish versions of these papers and the proceedings may be found in Gad 2005:124f. 
7
 The inverted commas around 'merely' are added because claiming that you are a Greenlander is difficult 
when you must do so in Danish (cf. section 5 in this paper, and Gad 2005:231).  
8
 Much post-structuralist writing relates identity to a single radical Other (cf. Campbell 1992). Such a focus 
entails a risk of leading to rather monolithic analyses and, hence, a risk of rendering politics – in the sense of 
negotiating new identities – impossible (cf. Hall 1991:58; Neumann 1996:157; Frello 2003:31). 
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9
 This conclusion depends on the specific empirical focus of my analysis. Other foci might have singled out 
other elements of identity.  
10
 At least as Greenlandic identity is constructed in the debate on language. 
11
 The election of monolingual Greenlandic-speaking Hans Enoksen, initially as chairman of the ruling 
Siumut party and ultimately as prime minister of the Home Rule government, could be perceived as an insistence on the 
possibility for monolingual Greenlandic speakers to be eligible for any position in post-colonial Greenland. Hence, 
Enoksen becomes the embodiment of the greater process of Greenlandization. 
12
 One crude means of demonstrating this point would be to compare the length of formal education of the 
bilingual members of the elite with the monolingual members of the same elite. The difference, which is substantial, 
would provide a rough estimate of the privilege awarded by Greenlandic language skills. 
13
 Due to the lack of skilled labour in a variety of fields in Greenland, many positions are advertised in 
Denmark, including most of the positions in the Home Rule bureaucracy requiring university education. Better 
integration in Greenlandic society of the Danish migrant workers taking these positions might motivate some of them to 
remain longer and hence lower the transaction costs of importing new temporary workers.  
14
 Prior to the introduction of Home Rule, the Danish authorities prioritized the teaching of and in the Danish 
language over the teaching of and in the Greenlandic language in Greenlandic primary schools. This was intended to 
ensure the most efficient modernization of Greenland; and the prioritization was made with the explicit accept from – 
and sometimes even urged by – Greenlandic consultative organs. After the introduction of Home Rule in 1979, separate 
Danish language classes for the children of (temporary) Danish migrants were upheld. However, a number of 
Greenlandic or mixed couple parents preferred for their children to attend these Danish language classes to ensure their 
opportunity to pursue further education (Engell 1982; Larsen 1992a; Heilmann 1999; cf. Forchhammer 2001). These 
priorities by Danish and Greenlandic authorities and individuals have meant that a substantial number of Greenlanders 
today – for most practical purposes – do not speak Greenlandic, but only Danish. 
15
 Poststructuralist theorizing of the subject in relation to discourse highlights the problems of Hirschman's 
category of 'loyalty' (1970), since the silence may be more or less enforced by power relations.  
16
 Cf. the four models of post-colonial texts in Ashcroft et al. (eds) 2002: Ch.1; three more or less essentialist 
(the national, the race-based, the comparative) and the fourth focused on hybridity. 
17
 Opinion polls consistently indicate that 80-90% of the population favours independence – but 80-90% also 
add that independence must not be achieved at the cost of a reduction of the level of welfare (Skydsbjerg 2002). 
18
 Perhaps a 'de-colonized' identity would have been a better label for what the paper is proposing – parallel 
to the 'de-securitization' advocated by Wæver as an alternative to thinking international politics (and identity politics) in 
terms of security/insecurity (1995; cf. 1993). If only the 'de-colonization' label had not already been used for the process 
which unfortunately did not lead to 'de-colonized' identities, but merely to a post-coloniality including the unfortunate 
traits the paper has been analyzing. 
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19
 One important step forward would be accepting Langgård's distinction between language as an identity 
factor and language as heuristic/communicative tool (2003:229). However, such acceptance cannot be decided top-
down; it must be facilitated by a change in practice, such as the one suggested in this paper. 
20
 Of course, the present members of the colonizing society have not chosen the relationship either. 
21
 Or formally: integrated as an overseas community (collectivité departementale d'outre-mer). 
22
 Overseas Countries and Territories (TEC art. 187). Greenland enjoys the same status. 
23
 There have been no regular west-bound airline services out of Greenland for some years. 
24
 Article 9 of the Home Rule Act would probably prevent Danish from immediately being dropped 
altogether. The present dependence of the Greenlandic welfare state on this language would, however, make such a 
short-term exercise rather damaging, anyway. Nevertheless, the argument of the paper remains that nothing would 
prevent greater investments in teaching English. The political discussion concerns where the resources should be drawn 
from; it need not be from teaching Danish, even though this would probably would be a sane thing to do in the long run. 
25
 Fishman et al. 1977; 1996. Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas (1997) take up the point of view that English is 
a threat as a principled position on language policies in general.  
26
 For the development of post-Soviet Estonian and Latvian language policies, see Laitin 2003; Metuzāle-
Kangere & Ozolins 2005; Verschik 2005. 
27
 Ponarin (2000) rebuffs Laitin's point, aiming more at the meagre possibility of the Estonians ever accepting 
Russians as Estonians due to an essentialist conception of ethnicity than at the role of English in such a process. 
Whether Ponarin is right or not, the situation in Greenland is different, since the diacriticon which decisively excludes 
the monolingual Danish-speaking Greenlanders is the language itself. This article attempts to facilitate the ease of this 
diacriticon. 
28
 Two conditions distinguish the situations: first, the alternative labour market for Danish speakers is 
comparatively more attractive in economical terms than the market for Russian speakers. Second, the prospects for 
linguistic self-sufficiency in relation to the labour force are comparatively less credible for a mono-linguistic Greenland  
of 50,000 inhabitants than it is for a Baltic nation 20-50 times as large. Both conditions make the Danish-speaking 
Greenlander less disposable. 
29
 A switch to English would, of course, not mean the end of all aspects of post-coloniality. English may, as 
Karen Oslund reminds me, indeed be perceived as the global post-colonial language per se. Hence, there is no escape 
from domination and dependency. Nevertheless, replacing Danish with English might possibly relieve the post-colonial 
bond between Greenland and Denmark, and hence ameliorate some of the specific problems facing Greenland on its 
way to independence. 
